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University of Minnesota
ABSTRACT
Markets for information technology products such as computers and operating systems are characterized
by significant externalities. Research in economics shows that markets characterized by externalities often
come to be dominated by few (often single) products (which may or may not be technically superior).
Such domination threatens technological diversity, which, this paper argues, is valuable to users of
computing. The paper suggests actions by IS managers that support diversity in the face of market
dynamics favoring concentration.
1. INTRODUCTION *'What features of IT products contribute to
concentration of market share?"
This paper deals with the issue of how diverse information
technologies (IT) can co-exist in user organizations. Two features that differentiate IT products from other
Certain economic characteristics of IT products work industrial products are:
against the preservation of diversity, leading instead to the
domination of markets by one or very few technological (a) The systemic nature of IT products. At the level of
alternatives. Section 2 of the paper identifies these eco- the single computer, hardware, operating systems and
nomic characteristics of IT products. Section 3 applies application packages must work together in a coordi-
concepts from the economics of compatibility and standard- nated manner for the computer to satisfy customers'
ization (supported by historical evidence) to explain why needs. Individual computers are themselves compo-
the economic characteristics identified in section 2 lead to nents in networks, which, in turn, comprise the higher
market concentration, with corresponding loss of diversity. level IT architecture of an organization. By "the
Section 4 points out the benefits of technological diversity systemic nature of IT products" we refer to the fact
in the IT resources of organizations, i.e., why diversity is that individual IT products are components of higher
worth striving for. Section 5 concludes the paper by level systems which actually deliver the service of
examining what IS managers can do to counter the ten- information processing to user organizations (Matutes
dency toward the loss of technological diversity. and Regibeau 1987). The choice and perfonnance of
IT products is, therefore, strongly determined by
factors other than the intrinsic capability of the prod-
2. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF uct, such as its relationship to other components in the
IT PRODUCTS network. In later sections, we will discuss how this
systemic nature affects technological diversity.
The controversy surrounding Microsoft's domination of the
PC operating system and package software markets (Busi- (b) The network externalities in the usage of IT prod-
ness Week 1993) is just the most recent instance where ucts. An "externality" is defined as an action that
customers have worried about the loss of diversity in IT brings direct benefits or costs to others, but these do
products. Similar concerns have been voiced about IBM's not sufficiently enter into the utility calculus of the
role in the mainframe market of the 1960s and early 1970s, decision maker (Hemenway 1988). The term "net-
and about the role of Intel in the microprocessor market of work externality" refers to the increase in the utility of
the 1980s. A logical question that follows from these a product to a user due to the presence of other users
observations is: in the "network" (Katz and Shapiro 1985): The
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utility that a given user derives from an IT product (a) non-disclosure and manipulation of component inter-
increases with the number of other agents using the faces, and
product. The utility of communication technologies
such as e-mail depends directly on who else uses it (b) predatory pricing on particular components through
(and, thus, can be reached by it). In other cases, the "bundling."
benefits from others' usage of the same product is
indirect and market-mediated. Hardware platforms Integrated vendors can exploit compatibility to drive out
with a larger installed base are more likely to be competition, leading to significant loss of technological
supported by software vendors; also, spare parts and diversity (Greenstein 1990). Such allegations have been
service for such platforms may be easier to find. leveled recently against Microsoft Corporation (Business
Benefits arising to existing users from the actions of Week 1993), whose share of the Windows applications
other adopters of a product are externalities because the market is viewed by many as disproportionately large.
purchase decisions of subsequent adopters do not fully Microsoft Excel holds 73% of the Windows spreadsheet
take into account the benefits or costs accruing to market (compared to the 20% share of Lotus, the DOS
existing users. The effect of network externalities on spreadsheet leader), while Microsoft Word holds 53% of
market structure will be described in the following the Windows word processing market (WordPerfect, the
section. DOS word processing leader, has 31% of this market).
Detractors of Microsoft allege that Microsoft's applications
programmers have advance details of its operating system
3. MARKETS FOR SYSTEMIC PRODUCTS WITH software and the company is slow to share vital information
NETWORK EXTERNALTrIES with third party developers. They also charge Microsoft
with offering low-ball prices on application programs,
The systemicity of IT products creates a need for compati- cross-subsidizing them with the profits from operating
bility: an assembly of incompatible products cannot meet systems sales, and bundling extra programs (such as disk
the needs of the customer. Benefits from compatibility lead compression, memory management and networking soft-
to demand-side economies of scale (i.e., '*benefits to doing ware) with the operating system.
what others do") in three ways (Farrell and Saloner 1986):
Attempts by integrated vendors to deter third party sup-
• Interchangeability of complementary products such pliers of IT components are not altogether new. In the
as software applications and storage media. For exam- early 1970s, several IBM system component competitors
ple, all IBM-compatible personal computers can run sued IBM for system redesigns initiated by IBM which
tile same software and can read and write to identically altered the interfaces of the components (Greenstein 1990).
formatted fixed and floppy disk drives. Interchangeab- For instance, peripheral makers were denied access to
ility of complementary products makes it easier to buy, interface specifications between the IBM System 370 CPUs
maintain, and operate components of a network, and the 3330 disk drives, delaying their product introduc-
tions in spite of their having built the requisite technologi-
• Ease of communication. Compatible IT products can cal capability (Brock 1975). Disentangling "predatory
communicate with one another. In fact, with the intent" from legitimate product alterations is often difficult,
growing emphasis on connectivity, the value of com- hence the integrated vendor enjoys significant leeway.
puters depends heavily on their "networking" (com-
munication) capabilities. Network externalities associated with IT products also
favor the concentration of market share in the hands of one
• Cost savings. The interchangeability of complemen- or few vendors. A number of mechanisms may convert an
tary products consolidates their markets, allowing initial multiple-vendor market to an oligopoly or a mono-
vendors to "mass produce" these products. Whether poly: these include learning effects, coordination effects
the resulting costs savings are passed on to customers and adaptive expectations (Arthur 1988). Learning effects
depends on the competitive forces in the particular act to improve products or lower their costs as their preva-
market. lence increases. Coordination effects confer advantages to
"going along" with other agents taking similar action.
When compatibility is important, the providers of "integrat- Adaptive expectations refers to the condition where in-
ed" systems stand to benefit significantly. Not only can IT creased prevalence of a technology in the market enhances
products from an integrated vendor be tailored to work beliefs of its further prevalence. All these mechanisms are
smoothly with one another, such a vendor can make it dif- self-reinforcing, so that the initial starting state combined
ficult for third parties to supply compatible components by with early random events push the dynamics of the market
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into domination by one or very few products. In the mation systems, while highly secure mainframe environ-
presence of self-reinforcing mechanisms, markets are ments may be chosen for processing sensitive or classified
characterized by: information. Serving the complex information processing
needs of today's corporation without technological diversity
• possible inefficiency (technically superior products may is like undertaking a complex construction project equipped
not predominate), with only a hammer for a tool: progress, if any, is bound
to be painfully slow. Diversity allows the user organization
• sequential-choice lock-in into technologies with lower to address each of its different information processing tasks
long-run potential, and with state-of-the-art IT for that task. All other things being
equal, the choice of a tool appropriate for the problem at
• path-dependence (early history and "luck" choose hand can make a significant difference.
between multiple equilibria).
All other things are never equal, however, and that brings
David (1985) describes the stability of the QWERTY us to another reason why diversity is important. Through
keyboard layout in spite of superior alternatives being an interaction of preferences and history, different indivi-
proposed from time to time. Through an interplay of duals come to have differential skills in different technolo-
learning effects (typing skills were developed around the gies (often to the extent of expertise m one technology and
layout) and adaptive expectations, the popularity of ignorance in all others). It is in the organization's econom-
QWERTY further increased the probability of its adoption ic interest to exploit the existing skills of its employees
by new customers. In spite of their technical superiority, instead of requiring them to learn new technologies. Not
other layouts such as the Dvorak keyboard could not only is technology learning a slow and expensive process,
compete against QWERTY. This example illustrates the earlier knowledge of another technology can interact in
conditions of technical inefficiency, lock-in, and path- unexpected ways (ranging from beneficial transfer to
dependency suggested by Arthur, where historical events "destructive" interference) with the current one being
have locked users into what is widely regarded as a less learned. In many situations, it may make sense in cost-
efficient technology. benefit terms for the organization to accommodate an
employee's preference for a familiar technology rather than
re-train the employee altogether. Diversity of technology is
4. THE CASE FOR DIVERSITY OF a reflection of such an accommodauve strategy.
TECHNOLOGY
Compared to most other technologies, IT is still character-
Except under strict assumptions - simultaneous, non- ized by a high rate of innovation. Investing in diverse
sequential adoption by all customers and the availability of technologies develops the absorptive capacity (Cohen and
perfect information to all customers about the preferences Levinthal 1990) of the firm in the long term. Absorptive
of all other customers - the adoption process for systemic capacity refers to the ability of the firm to recognize the
products with network externalities cannot be guaranteed to value of new technology, assimilate it and apply it lo
maximize social wel fare. S ince these assumptions are commercial ends. Firms which do not develop absorptive
violated most of the time, socially detrimental outcomes of capacity by investment in diverse technologies are poorly
individually "rational" adoption decisions cannot be ruled placed to recognize and exploit breakthroughs in these
out; for example, an innovative new technology that would technologies. Once off the "technology escalator," it is
have made all users betier off may not be adopted. Coordi- often difficult to get back on.
nation problems2 ("excess inertia") as well as the so-called
"penguin effece- contribute to such an outcome (Farrell A conscious acceptance of technological diversity also
and Saloner 1985, 1986). protects an organization against over-reliance on a single
vendor (Saloner 1990). Sunk investment in a proprietary
Social welfare apart diversity allows a user organization to technology (in the form of hardware, software and training)
use the best tools for each aspect of its task. The freedom and the tailoring of organizational systems around the
to choose appropriate tools for specific tasks can impact the technology are considerations contributing to a technology
productivity of computing significantly. PCs may be the lock-in in the long term. The single vendor may exploit
platform of choice for end-user developed systems, while a such lock-in by increasing prices. Hartman and Teece
network of workstations may be tile most efficient solution (1990) found that, in the minicomputer industry, vendors
for the processing power and stability requirements of often priced entry-level systems aggressively to lock in
mission-critical applications. A graphical user interface customers. Once the customer's switching costs rise, these
may be the most attractive for developing executive infor- vendors raise prices on subsequent generations of systems.
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Another hazard of depending on a single vendor is that, if standards are resisted by the dominant vendors of a
the vendor goes out of business, support for a proprietary product (Brock 1975; Greenstein 1990). In the past,
technology may be hard to find and user organizations are the government, in its dual role of a regulator and a
left stranded. Users of Wang business machines (the large customer, has taken the initiative in standard
vendor went bankrupt recently) encountered this situation, setting for many technologies including programming
although Digital has decided that providing support for languages and telecommunications. However, given
Wang equipment is an attractive commercial proposition. the increasing share of IT buying by the private sector
and its greater technological sophistication, IS mana-
gers in the private sector will have to promote stan-
5. THE ROLE OF IS MANAGERS dardization of products by vendors. By actively panic-
it}ating in standard setting processes, IS managers can
We have shown that certain economic features of IT are not aid the development of interface standards that support
conducive to diversity of technology, i.e., self-reinforcing product diversity.
mechanisms drive concentration of market share into one or
very few technologies. We have also argued that user (b) Supporting products with open and standardized
organizations benefit in both the short and the long term by interfaces: IS managers can express a preference for
consciously supporting diversity. If diversity is indeed products with open and standardized interfaces over
desirable, but the market mechanism does not work in its proprietary, closed architectures. Products conforming
favor, other approaches must be found to sustain diversity. to standards afford multi-vendor interoperability,
leaving the user organization the flexibility to assemble
The self-reinforcing diversity-reducing dynamic of the configurations of components closely matched to their
market is not easy to counteract. Although some coordina- specific needs. Multiple expansion and upgrade palhs
tion problems may be overcome by communications be- are also left open for the future, providing the capab-
tween IS managers of different organizations, others are ility to capitalize on technological breakthroughs
exacerbated by such communication. The "penguin habit" wherever they occur. Given the intuitive appeal of
of waiting to watch the other guy go first is often rewarded standardized products, it is not surprising that IS
by organizations. However, the community of IS managers managers are already seeking proof that the products
can still act in ways that correct the market's tendency to they buy will operate in open architectures such as
suppress diversity. Among the actions that can promote X/OPEN (Sopware Magazine 1992). Testing confor-
diversity in technology are: mance to standards is becoming increasingly complex,
but organizations specializing in conformance testing
(a) Promoting standardization: At first sight, standard- are arising to provide this essential service. Products
ization appears contrary to the aim of diversity. After that violate interface standards often tempt IS managers
all, if all products are standardized, where is the scope with higher performance (like US Robotics modems
for diversity? The type of standardization advocated which claimed higher data transfer rates than modems
here may be more precisely termed "interface stan- following standard protocols). An eye to the big
dardization" in contrast to "reference" or "minimum picture should help managers avoid decisions that bind
quality" standardization, which promotes similarity users to proprietary products.
between products. Interface standardization only
requires adherence to well-specified input and output (c) Investing in gateway technologies: One way to
conventions in the interests of inter-operability of simultaneously operate incompatible technologies is to
technology provided by different vendors. Given the invest in gateway technologies. David (198D provides
systemic nature of IT products, emergence of standards several examples of gateway technologies, most nota-
for inter-component interfaces allows customers to bly the rotary converter which enabled DC electric
"mix and match" components to assemble systems motors to be supplied current from AC generation
closer to their needs than existing integrated solutions plants and transmission lines. More familiar examples
(Matutes and Regibeau 1987). Mix-and-match variety of gateway technologies are programs that bridge
thus favors the co-existence of diverse technologies. different hardware and operating systems, allowing the
transfer of data and programs between DOS, Apple
Interface standards may be voluntary or regulated, and and Unix systems. Gateway products permit the ex
both of these processes of standardization have advan- postfacto integration of incompatible systems, and thus
tages and disadvantages (Cargill 1989). There is some help organizations to cope with technological diversity.
evidence to show that standardization differentially Unfortunately, gateway technologies are invariably
affects the competitive standing of vendors, so that threatened by integrated system vendors' ability to
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switch interfaces at short notice, rendering the current Brock, G. "Competition, Standards, and Self-Regulation in
generation of gateway products obsolete. For instance, the Computer Industry." In R. Caves (Ed.), Regulating the
Sun Microsystems has recently announced its intention Product: Quality and Variety, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
to provide a Windows application binary interface Ballinger Publishing, 1975.
(ABD to run on Unix systems so that shrink-wrapped
Windows applications could run on Unix systems Business Week. "Is Microsoft Too Powerful?" March 1,
without either Windows or DOS being installed (PC 1993, pp. 82-90.
Week 1993). Even before the ABI gateway is
launched, there are already fears that Microsoft may Cargill, C. F. Information Technology Standardization:
modify its application programmer interface (API), Theo,y, Processes, and Organizations. Bedford, Massachu-
undermining the utility of the proposed gateway. IS setts: Digital Press, 1989.
managers, working together through trade associations
and professional forums, can discourage such attempts Cohen, W. M., and Levinthal, D. A. "Absorptive Capa-
to perpetuate proprietary practices. city: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation."
Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 35, Number 1,
This paper has argued that diversity in technology, which March 1990, pp. 128-152.
is valuable to IT users, is often suppressed by market forces
which interact with characteristics of IT (such as system- David, P. A. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY."
icity and network externalities) to favor convergence on one American Economic Review, Volume 75, Number 2, 1985,
or very few technologies. While there are clear social and pp. 332-337.
individual benefits from standardization, the potential costs
of premature convergence on particular technologies to the David, P. A. "Some New Standards for the Economics of
exclusion of others are only beginning to be appreciated. Standardization in the Information Age." In P. Dasgupta
The self-reinforcing nature of economic mechanisms gives and P. L. Stoneman (Eds.), Econonuc Policy ami Techno-
markets for IT products the characteristics of dynamic 10gical Pe,formance, London: Cambridge University Press,
systems with positive feedback. Suci systems may have 1987, pp. 206-239.
multiple equilibria, only a few of which can be claimed to
be optimal. Depending on chance events in the early Farrell, J., and Saloner, G. "Installed Base and Compati-
history of such markets, products that come to dominate bility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Preda-
such markets may turn out to be sub-optimal ex post. Lion." American Economic Review, Volume 76, Number 5,
1986, pp. 940-955.
While no catch-all prescription (such as coordination of
technology purchases through professional networks) for Farrell, J., and Saloner, G. "Standardization, Compatib-
action by IS managers to support diversity is available at ility, and Innovation." Rand Journal Of Economics, Vol-
present, a conscious effort by the IS community to partici- ume 16, Number 1, Spring 1985, pp. 70-83.
pate in standard setting, support products with open stan-
dardized interfaces, and invest in gateway technologies can Greenstein, S. "Creating Economic Advantage by Setting
go a long way. As in any situation involving externalities, Compatibility Standards: Can 'Physical Tie-Ins' Extendthe self-interest of individual user organizations and the Monopoly Power?" Economics Of Innovation and Newinterest of the broader user community diverge significant-
ly. While no heroic commitment of time, effort and money Technology, Volume 1, 1990, pp. 63-83.
to the social interest should be expected from a user organi- Hartman, R. S., and Teece, D. J. "Product Emulationzation, IS managers' awareness of the long-run benefits of
technological diversity and the forces that run counter to it Strategies in the Presence of Reputation Effects and Net-
work Externalities: Some Evidence from the Minicomputercan lead to more informed choices of technology.
Industry." Economics of Innovation and New Technology,
Volume 1, 1990, pp. 157-182.
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3. Even though all customers would like to adopt the new
7. ENDNOTES technology, each would prefer that others go first (and
bear the initial risk and transient incompatibility costs).
1. The scope of the network is different for different
products. For a communication technology, the net-
work includes all the geographically dispersed mem-
bers who are connected by the technology, whereas,
from the point of view of desktop computers, the
immediate office environment may define the relevant
network.
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